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The Village of Billionaires: Fair Taxation and Redistribution
Amid Relative and Absolute Poverty
by Alexis Brassey and Henry Ordower

Alexis Brassey is a solicitor and a visiting
fellow, Faculty of Law, at the University of
Cambridge, U.K., and Henry Ordower is a
professor of law at Saint Louis University
School of Law in St. Louis, Missouri.
In this article, the authors explore the notion
of fairness in international tax using the parable
of the Village of Billionaires to highlight the
moral dilemma posed by redistributing tax
revenue to address relative poverty within a
developed country when absolute poverty
exists beyond the village walls.
Copyright 2020 Alexis Brassey and Henry
Ordower. All rights reserved.
Aptly named, the Village of Billionaires is
populated exclusively with billionaires. Every
family living there has abundant wealth and
privilege. Every driveway is lined with luxury
vehicles like Rolls Royces, Bentleys, and Ferraris.
Each house has its own swimming pool, gym
complex, helicopter, and helipad. The village
airport is filled with private Gulfstream and
Boeing aircrafts. Residents have access to the topnotch health services, education, road systems,
information and communications technology

equipment, and shopping facilities. Simply put,
villagers enjoy the very best of what the world has
to offer. The village governs itself by committee,
and each family nominates someone to sit on the
council.
Sadly, as a result of overspending on yachts
and fine wines, one of the families in the village
has suffered a financial setback — they are down
to their last $100 million dollars. The family
appeals to the village council, which sets up a
social metrics commission to develop an approach
1
to measuring poverty. The commission’s remit is
to identify those least able to make ends meet. It
takes into account all material resources, not just
incomes, and accounts for all the inescapable costs
that families may face including child care,
maintenance of super yachts, replenishing stocks
of fine wine, extensive foreign holidays, helicopter
maintenance, and mortgage costs.2 The
commission concludes that any family with less
than 40 percent of the median income and wealth
for the village falls within the poverty category,
and it resolves to develop interventions and
support to reduce the incidence of poverty and
mitigate the impact of poverty for those who
experience it.
To address the immediate problem, the
villagers impose a progressive wealth tax on the
billionaire families such that the family down to
their last $100 million has its wealth restored to the
$400 million range and therefore is no longer

1

The Legatum Institute Foundation’s Social Metrics Commission
report uses similar language to explain its methodology for generating a
working definition of poverty for the United Kingdom. Philippa Stroud,
“Measuring Poverty 2019 — A Report of the Social Metrics
Commission,” The Legatum Institute Foundation (July 2019).
2

This is not to suggest that super yachts, fine wine, and extensive
foreign holidays are inescapable costs per se, but that they appear so
based on a relative — rather than an absolute — analysis. In other words,
the definition of inescapable costs is relative.
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suffering from poverty based on the commission’s
assessment. The family is also given access to an
emergency fund to ensure it does not fall into
poverty again. To save embarrassment, the
emergency fund is available on a universal basis
and is not means tested. The villagers happily
declare the problem solved.
Outside the village walls, there is another
town. That town is suffering from actual poverty
as defined by the U.N., that is:
a condition characterized by severe
deprivation of basic human needs,
including food, safe drinking water,
sanitation facilities, health, shelter,
education and information. It depends not
only on income but also on access to
3
services.
The Village of Billionaires is the principal
place of employment for town residents. Workers
from the town commute to the village to maintain
its facilities and perform other routine and menial
functions. Some workers provide household
services and child care on a residential basis and
must be available around the clock; they are
housed in quarters similar to the housing in their
own town, but with more attractive exteriors to
maintain the village’s overall aura. Wages are
based on the prevailing wage that residents of the
other town earn when working in their own town
or elsewhere to ensure that workers receive a fair,
comparable wage for their town. Workers who
have completed at least 40 quarters of
employment in the Village of Billionaires are
entitled to a retirement benefit beginning at age
65. Anyone who works in the Village of
Billionaires must contribute a nonrefundable 20
percent of their wages to the retirement benefit
fund. Those who do not complete 40 quarters of
employment receive nothing from the fund. Of
course, those who work in the Village of
Billionaires probably pay taxes where they live as
well.
When criticized for the opulence of their
community alongside the impoverished town,
residents of the Village of Billionaires are quick to
point out that they are job creators. Without them,

3

U.N., “Report of the World Summit for Social Development” (Mar.
6-12, 1995).
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conditions in the town — to which the residents of
the Village of Billionaires owe nothing — would
be much worse. Unemployment would be higher
without the wealthy neighbor. And nothing
prevents resourceful residents of the poorer town
from becoming billionaires and eventually
applying to immigrate to the Village of
Billionaires. Nevertheless, the Village of
Billionaires allocates up to 2 percent of its annual
budget to foreign assistance, and residents of
various impoverished communities thank the
residents of the Village of Billionaires for the
assistance with nice letters and remember the aid
in their evening prayers. Most billionaire
residents happily pay their fair share of the taxes
needed to maintain the community and provide
foreign assistance, although some grumble about
expenditures like foreign assistance that do not
benefit them directly.
I. Introduction
4

This reductio ad absurdum parable introduces
the stark contrast between relative and absolute
poverty. Both concepts are important when
determining tax structures. Recent discussions
about tax justice and the principles underpinning
the international tax regime often emphasize the
idea that companies and individuals should pay
their fair share — not just in the domestic sense,
5
but also in an international sense. It is reasonable
to assume that taxation is the means by which the
state funds public services and, in some
jurisdictions, contributes to greater equality. The
parable, however, shows that relative poverty
within a society may be a false indication of
genuine need, and it reminds the reader that
empirical data can help us refocus our definition
of fairness. This is not to suggest that relative
poverty is a pseudo-need, but that the moral
obligation to resolve relative poverty is minimal
when compared with the far more pressing
problem of absolute poverty. Setting a goal of

4

Absurdity is itself relative — after all, the Village of Billionaires has
features reminiscent of several developed democracies.
5

OECD, “Ensuring Multinationals Pay a Fair Share of Taxes” (last
accessed Mar. 1, 2020); Tax Justice UK, “Fair Share: Increasing Company
Tax Contributions” (last accessed Mar. 1, 2020); IRS, “The Agency, Its
Mission and Statutory Authority” (last accessed Mar. 1, 2020); and HM
Revenue & Customs, “Tackling Tax Avoidance, Evasion, and Other
Forms of Non-Compliance” (Mar. 2019).
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contributing to greater equality within a society
necessarily gives rise to competing claims
internationally. This is especially the case when
considering international tax challenges such as
those the OECD discusses in its 2019 work
6
program for taxing the digital economy.
This article examines competing claims for tax
revenues and considers the specific categories of
relative, as opposed to absolute, poverty. If one
accepts that taxation is to fund public services, the
question then arises, at least in international tax:
Which jurisdiction’s public services should be
funded? If the motivation for raising taxes is to
tackle inequality, what has the greater claim,
international inequality or national inequality?
These questions require us to consider whether
relative or absolute poverty is more pressing. If
we conclude that international inequality and
absolute poverty are more pressing, are we still
permitted to use resources to address national
inequality and relative poverty? What if we lack
the resources, political will, and popular support
necessary to confront international inequality and
absolute poverty?
This article contends that there is a far
7
stronger moral claim for tax revenue to be
redistributed on an international basis rather than
a national basis. Further, it argues that the
purported moral authority to address inequality
within national borders is really a political
demand to further the economic interests of
particular groups that are already among the
most economically privileged when viewed on an
international spectrum. This article also finds that
we lack the political will to truly confront
international poverty — at least beyond
contributing minimal resources to fight
international poverty, which ultimately means we
acknowledge the problem, but refuse to make the
sacrifices necessary provide a remedy.
Resource availability is also a relative concept:
The bulk of any national budget is committed to
maintaining existing infrastructure leaving little
funding for international development unless one

opts to sacrifice maintenance for the morally
superior aim of eliminating absolute poverty.
Accordingly, the resources that are considered
available for allocation in this article are only
those resources dedicated to addressing either
local or international poverty.
This article is divided into six sections,
including this introduction. Section II tackles
slippery definitional problems around the terms
“tax justice” and “fair share.” What do these
terms mean when they are used by different
economic agents and to what end? What do those
agents want to achieve when they use these terms,
and what moral basis do they rely upon to make
those claims? Can claims of fairness pertaining to
equality extend to redistribution beyond specific
absolute levels of resource allocation and, if so,
what levels?
Section III sets out a proposal for ongoing
discourse based on the idea that claims for using
tax resources to fund efforts within national
boundaries are political as opposed to moral —
that is, they are not based on economic merit. If we
take redistribution as a moral imperative
seriously, we must put the greater international
need above national, political demands.
Section IV considers the practical implications
of this analysis in the context of the latest iteration
of the OECD’s base erosion and profit-shifting
initiative, known as BEPS 2.0. The OECD’s work
program is aimed at revising the existing
structure of profit allocation as well as the nexus
rules, efforts that may generate a novel set of
international tax rules.
Section V assesses the political philosophical
arguments for and against global distributive
justice. It considers the cases of cosmopolitans,
realists, nationalists, and Rawlsians.8 The article
concludes that the complex interplay of political,
economic, and social cooperation in the 21st
century requires an urgent reevaluation of the
way in which distributive justice is and should be
practiced.
8

6

OECD, “Programme of Work to Develop a Consensus Solution to
the Tax Challenges Arising From the Digitalisation of the Economy”
(May 2019) (hereinafter, work program).
7

Morality is itself a contentious term. This article contends that its
moral force works on any of a utilitarian, Kantian, or Aristotelian
definition.

From the works of John Rawls, an American political philosopher
(1921-2002), discussed in greater detail infra notes 90-93, Rawlsian
justice, broadly speaking, revolves around the idea that differences in
society are largely a legacy of luck. In order to determine how political
institutions ought to be arranged, Rawls proposes that differences in
society ought only to be tolerated insofar as they improve the position of
the weakest members. Rawls does not suggest that “society” should be
viewed from a global perspective; this article suggests otherwise.
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The final section considers whether there is
any continuing moral value in redistribution to
address relative poverty within national borders
absent the resources and political will to also
address absolute poverty internationally, and
concludes that there is none. It also yields insight
into the motives of those with wealth and power
who choose to share only as much of their wealth
as may be necessary to prevent the less wealthy in
their vicinity from forcibly seizing wealth and
power.
II. Tax Justice
Everyone believes in justice. After all, who
will publicly declare a goal of injustice? The term
has found its way into the names of tax lobbying
groups such as the Tax Justice Network and
Global Alliance for Tax Justice. Their aims,
however, are highly political and their
perspectives often differ from other lobbying
groups that invoke their own (politically
informed) perspective on justice. Likewise, it is
difficult to imagine there are many economic
agents who would express their desire not to pay
their “fair share.” Language as loose as “fair
share” can mean such different things to different
people that it ends up not really meaning
anything beyond expressing the political
predilections of the utterer. To a multinational
enterprise’s board of directors, the terms “justice”
and “fair share” mean operating within the legal
framework of the jurisdictions in which they
9
operate. Others, as discussed below, have a very
different perspective.
Given the politically charged nature of these
terms, it is surprising how frequently those tasked
with the administration of the tax system use
them. For example, HM Revenue & Customs
appears to substitute references to the amount of
tax large businesses legally need to pay with the

10

statement that they should pay their fair share —
suggesting there are additional obligations
beyond that which is legally necessary. When
discussing cross-border tax arrangements, HMRC
states that “the government supports a
competitive corporate tax system but is clear that
companies must pay their fair share.” Much of the
difference, in HMRC’s view, relates to tax
avoidance; however, it is far from clear that the
definition is restricted to only that issue.
The IRS’s mission statement states that its role
is to ensure the “minority who are unwilling to
comply [with tax law] pay their fair share.”11 The
violation of unambiguous tax laws constitutes
noncompliance and evasion, but compliance is
itself an ambiguous term. Compliance could also
mean not structuring one’s affairs at the very
limits of tax law ambiguity in a way that
minimizes tax liability — that is, not engaging in
12
tax avoidance. Tax avoidance is a far more
difficult concept than tax evasion since avoidance
depends on an accepted understanding of the
legislative intent underlying ambiguous tax law
language. While the United States relates fairness
— a term explored in greater depth in Section III
— back to legality as opposed to more politically
driven notions of justice or fairness, those notions
control the activities of the IRS as it responds to
the legislative will. Those ideals also influence the
legislature and tax administrators when they
decide to respond to planning by eliminating
ambiguity or decide not to act, although the latter
can also occur because the authorities lack the
resources to respond immediately as tax planners
continuously devise structures at the limits of the
law.
A recently disclosed sophisticated tax
planning scheme involving so-called “cum-cum”
and “cum-ex” share trading exemplifies the
tension between tax planning within the law and
violations of the law. Germany did not expressly
outlaw transactions that enabled German

9

See, e.g., Apple, “The Facts About Apple’s Tax Payments” (Nov. 6,
2017). How corporations ought to behave is far from a settled matter.
Milton Friedman argues that directors-as-individuals may have their
own personal political and moral views, but their legal duties require
them to operate in accordance with the law and their fiduciary duties
require them to maximize shareholder value. Friedman, “The Social
Responsibility of Business Is to Enhance Its Profits,” 32(13) The New York
Times Magazine 122 (Sept. 3, 1970). Others disagree with this, suggesting
that corporate social responsibility is in the interest of a wider group of
stakeholders that directors ought to consider. See Judith Freedman, “Tax
and Corporate Responsibility,” 695 Tax J. (Jan. 1, 2003).

100

10
11

HMRC, supra note 5.
IRS, supra note 5.

12

Henry Ordower, “The Culture of Tax Avoidance,” 55 Saint Louis U.
L.J. 47 (2010).
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taxpayers to claim a credit for a dividend
withholding tax that was not actually paid on
shares that non-Germans owned and lent or sold
short to Germans near the ex-dividend date that
were then returned to the non-German owner,
and it permitted both the owner of shares and the
buyer of the shorted shares to claim the German
credit for dividend withholding.13 It is difficult to
imagine how two taxpayers paying their “fair
share” can receive a refund of the same tax.
Nevertheless, because the scheme was not made
expressly illegal, one might argue that claiming
the refund was compliant with the tax law and
thus consistent with tax justice.
While it is understandable that tax authorities
want to reduce tax evasion and tax avoidance, it
seems reasonable to expect their role to be
restricted to the apolitical realm — that is, limited
to their legal fiat. On this analysis, moral
questions about justice and one’s fair share should
be restricted to the political realm.
However, it also seems legitimate for political
lobbying groups to argue in favor of a particular
political or moral position even if this means
claiming that their use of terms like “fair share” is
not a legal prescription, but rather a normative
expression. Tax Justice UK, for example, asserts
that “large companies in the UK do not contribute
14
their fair share of tax to the exchequer.” The
group acknowledges that when it uses the term
“fair share,” it means businesses should pay more
tax than they owe. Tax Justice UK encourages
public review of the cost-benefit analysis used to
draft corporate reliefs and subsidies; it hopes to
see an abandonment of the ideology of tax
competition, a tightening of efforts to reduce
avoidance, and better enforcement. Once again, it
difficult to imagine that many would disagree
with the idea that economic agents should pay
what they legally owe, but it is far from clear that
justice requires paying more — although it is clear
that the terminology is political and cannot easily
be characterized objectively.
There are cogent, albeit contested, arguments
in favor of the idea that increases in corporate tax

15

lead to reductions in overall tax yield. If true, this
would appear to harm those reliant on tax
revenue and reduce the welfare of everyone in the
system. Assuming, however, that increases in
taxation did lead to increases in tax revenue, what
would that mean in terms of justice? For many on
the communitarian end of the political spectrum,
justice would require increases in taxation. They
would claim that vital public services are
16
underfunded, noting that there are significant
welfare needs throughout the public sector and
17
increasing reliance on food banks. Looking at the
United Kingdom as an example, they would
argue that the National Health Service (NHS) is in
a permanent crisis; education is underfunded;
teachers, doctors, and nurses are not paid enough;
local authority services have been cut; and that the
whole austerity enterprise has created
devastation and misery since the financial crisis in
2008.18 The point being made here is that there are
many academics, lobby groups, and other
organizations actively making moral claims for
more money (that is, demanding scarce resources
from the state for the alleviation of relative
poverty without reference to the demands of
absolute poverty). What is clear from these
sources is that they all attempt to dress their
demands as moral claims as opposed to
straightforward political or economic bargaining
requests. Use of the word “crisis” is prevalent,
indicating that unless their demands are met,
something “terrible” will happen to the public,
which requires immediate attention.
Based on this analysis, the demands of justice
require increases in public services that have a
redistributional effect and are paid for by taxing
19
those who can comfortably afford to pay more.
The argument, put in these terms, is one based on

15

See, e.g., Richard Teather, “The Effect of Labour’s Corporation Tax,”
Adam Smith Institute blog, May 12, 2017; Alex Brill and Kevin A.
Hassett, “Revenue-Maximizing Corporate Income Taxes: The Laffer
Curve in OECD Countries,” AEI Working Paper No. 137 (2007); and Joel
Slemrod, “Chapter 6: On the High-Income Laffer Curve,” in Tax
Progressivity and Income Inequality (1996).
16

Kam Gill, “Austerity Won’t Be Over Until Our Public Services Get
the Funding They Need,” TUC blog, Oct. 26, 2018.
17

Rachel Loopstra et al., “Austerity, Sanctions, and the Rise of Food
Banks in the UK,” The BMJ Online blog, Apr. 8, 2015.
18

13

Sophie Arie, “Austerity in the UK: Rising Poverty Threatens
Stability and Health,” The BMJ Online blog, Nov. 19, 2018.

14

Chris Giles and Delphine Strauss, “Costs Soars for Labour’s Grand
Pledge to Reshape the Economy,” The Financial Times, Sept. 2, 2019.

Lee A. Sheppard, “Anticipating EU Tax Haven Hybrid Rules,” Tax
Notes Int’l, Sept. 23, 2019, p. 1217.
Tax Justice UK, supra note 5.

19
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justice and fairness: After all, shouldn’t a country
as wealthy as the United Kingdom provide
20
minimum levels of public services? An issue that
arises, however, is how to define the acceptable
minimum. How much resource redistribution
should the state engage in? Is there a level of
comfort beyond which the state can say that
further intervention to narrow wealth distribution
is beyond its mandate? To understand this issue,
one must consider the problems of relative versus
absolute poverty.21
A. Absolute Poverty: Analysis
In 2015 it was estimated that around 10
percent of the world’s population — more than
700 million people — were living in conditions of
22
actual poverty. Childhood deaths are one of the
threats of absolute global poverty.
In 2018 the World Health Organization
estimated that 6.2 million children and
adolescents under the age of 15 died from
preventable causes.23 The leading causes of
childhood deaths were preterm birth
complications, pneumonia, birth asphyxia,
congenital anomalies, diarrhea, and malaria. The
WHO suggests that:
more than half of these early child deaths
are preventable or can be treated with
simple, affordable interventions including
immunization, adequate nutrition, safe
water and food and appropriate care by a
trained health provider.
Goal number one in the U.N.’s sustainable
development goals is to “end poverty in all its
forms everywhere.” Outside of our hypothetical
Village of Billionaires, having a job does not
guarantee a decent living. Discussing this goal,
the U.N. cites some sobering statistics for 2018
(although there is little reason to believe there has

been major change in two years). Worldwide, 8
percent of employed workers and their families
lived in extreme poverty. For ages 24-34, there
were 122 women living in extreme poverty for
every 100 men. The majority of those who were
living on less than $1.90 per day were in subSaharan Africa. One in five children lived in
extreme poverty. Fifty-five percent of the world’s
population had no access to social protection.
Only 41 percent of women giving birth in 2018
received maternity benefits.
At the same time, as the world is facing the
very real problem of absolute poverty, developed
countries like the United Kingdom are devoting
large amounts of money to far different
priorities. In the United Kingdom, John
24
McDonnell, Labour shadow chancellor from
2010 to 2015, argued that the provision of
Universal Basic Services is consistent with
Labour’s belief in universalism and the
25
importance of the services we all share.
Estimates suggest that in 2014 the United
Kingdom spent more than £5 billion on benefits
for those with incomes that exceeded £100,000 per
annum (about $6.22 billion and $124,000,
respectively).26 According to one report, in 2018
the U.K.’s foreign aid budget came to around £14
billion with £1.75 million going toward paying
bonuses to civil servants, including £243,000 for
27
top officials. In excess of £400 million of the U.K.
government’s money is spent on its arts and
entertainment program, which includes funding
28
for lavish productions at the Royal Opera House.
The Sovereign Grant, which maintains the Queen,
the royal family, and their palaces, came to a total
29
of £82.2 million for 2018-2019. In 2019 the Labour

24

Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English defines shadow
chancellor as “the politician in the main opposition party in the British
parliament who would become chancellor etc. if their party was in
government, and who is responsible for speaking on the same subjects.”
25

20

Sven-Olof Lodin, “Swedish Tax Reforms 1071-77 — Why So
Many?” 56 Acta Universitatis Stockholmiensis Studia Juridica
Stockholmiensia 181 (1977) (observing that building the welfare state
required the bulk of taxes to be imposed on the middle class, but steeply
progressive rates applicable to wealthy taxpayers were necessary to
ensure that the middle class would accept the plan).
21

See U.N., supra note 3 and accompanying text.

22

Zack Beauchamp, “The World’s Victory Over Extreme Poverty in
One Chart,” Vox, Dec. 14, 2014.
23

WHO, “Children: Reducing Mortality” (Sept. 2019).

102

Ordower, “Uniform International Tax Collection for Global
Development, a *(**)topian BEPS Alternative” (unpublished manuscript
on file with author).
26

Taxpayers’ Alliance, “New Bumper Book of Government Waste
Exposes £120 Billion of Wasteful Spending — That’s £4,500 for Every
Household in the UK” (June 15, 2014).
27

David Wilcock, “Staff in Charge of the UK’s £14 Billion Foreign Aid
Budget Shared £1.75 Million in Bonuses Last Year Including £10,000P to
Senior Civil Servants,” Daily Mail, Aug. 12, 2019.
28

The Arts Council England, “How We Invest Public Money” (2018).

29

Deputy Treasurer to the Queen, “The Sovereign Grant and
Sovereign Grant Reserve” (Mar. 2019).
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Party proposed increasing U.K. government
expenditure on public services by around £80
billion in addition to the £800 billion already
30
devoted to those services.
The Labour Party’s vision for international
development is set out in a document entitled, “A
World for the Many, Not the Few.” It states:
The Labour Party stands ready to lead the
transition to a fairer world. The singular
mission of international development
under Labour will be to build a world for
the many, not the few. Labour will
wholeheartedly back the Sustainable
Development Goals (SDGs) as a
31
progressive route to building that world.
In spite of government spending
commitments totaling more than £800 billion and
in spite of the Labour leadership being among the
most egalitarian Western political parties, the
government only proposes directing 70 pence out
of every £100 made in the United Kingdom
toward eradicating absolute poverty — a
commitment that had already been met by the
32
center-right Conservative administration.
Instead, the country spends its vast tax revenue on
its royal family, with their private jets, fine wines,
and royal palaces; opera performances; and
welfare handouts to those with incomes in excess
of £100,000 per year — an approach to global
poverty that is similar to other countries in the
OECD.
The United States doesn’t have a monarchy or
royal palaces to maintain. The White House is
merely a cottage in comparison with the grand
palaces of the United Kingdom. Salaries for
government officials remain modest relative to
those of highly compensated corporate
executives. The president receives $400,000 per
year plus expenses, certainly well above the
average of $45,000 for American workers, but far
below the income earned by CEOs of major
corporations who often earn in excess of $50

33

million annually. Direct government support for
the arts has disappeared almost entirely in the
United States, but indirect support through an
income tax deduction for charitable contributions
is a significant benefit that lacks any meaningful
government oversight. Excluding donations to
healthcare and education, the expected cost of
providing tax breaks to donors for charitable
contributions will exceed $555 billion for the 1034
year period from 2019 to 2028. Many income tax
expenditures inure primarily to the benefit of
high-income or high-net-worth taxpayers in the
United States, including the stepped-up new
“basis at death” rule (an estimated $222 billion
expenditure for 2019 to 2028) and preferential
rates for long-term capital gains (estimated to cost
more than $1.5 trillion from 2019 to 2028).35
Proposals from some of the former candidates for
the 2020 Democratic Party nomination for
president would have made the United States
more like the United Kingdom in terms of the
universal provision of benefits with plans
including providing Medicare to all and free
college tuition36 or a universal basic income.37 The
presumptive Democratic presidential nominee
Joe Biden’s plans are far more tame and
traditional. His policy proposals emphasize
support for jobs through unions, environmental
improvement, and infrastructure projects for
roads, railroads, broadband, and airports.38
The total U.S. budget for 2020 is estimated to
be more than $4.6 trillion (not including the
extraordinary expenditures associated with the
ongoing economic relief from the COVID-19

33

See Kathleen Elkins, “Here’s the Last Time the President of the
United States Got a Raise,” CNBC Make It, Feb. 19, 2018; and AFL-CIO,
“Highest-Paid CEOs” (last accessed Mar. 1, 2020).
34

Depending on the donor’s tax characteristics, each dollar donated
reduces the donor’s tax liability by up to 37 cents — a subsidy with no
government oversight beyond determining whether the recipient is
qualified to receive charitable contributions. Most arts organizations do.
See U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Tax Analysis, “Tax
Expenditures” (Oct. 29, 2018) (including specific tables for 2018, 2019,
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pandemic) with some $32 billion —
approximately 60 cents out of every $100 spent —
devoted to foreign assistance, which includes
approximately $9 billion for “peace and security”
(primarily stabilization efforts).39 Of the $4.6
trillion, only $6.5 million is dedicated to
humanitarian assistance, including migration
management; $7 billion to health, with only $690
million focused on maternal and children’s health;
and a mere $2 billion for economic development,
most of which takes the form of industry
subsidies.
Even among the most socialistic of those who
ran to be the 2020 Democratic presidential
nominee, there was no discussion about
substantially increasing the U.S. development
budget to relieve world poverty — although
section 170 of the U.S. tax code continues to offer
a charitable contribution deduction for eligible
taxpayers who contribute to U.S. charitable
entities working to relieve world poverty. It also is
clear that the COVID-19 pandemic has caused the
United States to look even more inward. The first
$2 trillion economic relief package did not include
40
foreign aid. Also, the United States suspended
funding for WHO and closed its borders to
immigrants, except low-wage temporary workers
needed to harvest crops and some specialized
workers.
B. Relative Poverty: An Analysis
The parable that opens this article is designed
to provoke. It is a reductio ad absurdum
demonstrating how definitions of relative poverty
fare when compared to the more serious issue of
absolute poverty. The Village of Billionaires,
however, is a modern tale about the differentials
in global wealth and the way in which the
language used by redistributionalists in
developed economies has led to the appropriation
of resources that, on any legitimate moral ground,
could be dedicated to far more serious and
pressing issues.

When considering questions of global
inequality and redistribution, the key issue is not
whether billionaires or multinationals ought to
pay more, it is whether residents of the Village of
Billionaires who are less affluent — or the less
affluent residents of OECD countries — should
expect that redistributed funds will accrue to
them or to those who are far needier. The scale
and scope of relative need compared with the real
problem of absolute poverty is such that even
some groups who claim to be in crisis and in
desperate need themselves have a moral duty to
redistribute their own assets toward the absolute
poor as defined by the U.N. It is interesting to
observe that individuals in developed economies
who experience need (but not absolute poverty)
demonstrate a greater willingness to share limited
resources than is seen among the wealthy. On
average, low-income individuals contribute a far
higher percentage of their income to charities than
41
high-income individuals.
When comparing GDP per capita, per annum
— a useful but imperfect comparison tool that
materially overstates the resources at the lower
end of the scale because, in all countries,
distribution of GDP is skewed toward those with
property and power — the EU averages about
$43,700, with the United Kingdom’s coming in at
$45,500, which also happens to be the OECD
42
average. The United States stands at $62,600. The
world’s poorest economies, such as Burundi, the
Central African Republic, the Democratic
Republic of Congo, Niger, Liberia, Malawi, and
Mozambique, all have GDPs per capita below
$1,500 a year.
According to GDP per capita data, which may
change materially because of the worldwide
impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, the average
person in the United Kingdom is more than 61
times better off than the average person in
Burundi, which has per capita GDP of only $744
per year. Perhaps that method of assessment is too
crude, and a better metric might be looking at
how someone in the lower-income bracket in the

41
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See Congressional Budget Office, “Budget” (last accessed Mar. 2,
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ForeignAssistance.gov (last accessed Mar. 2, 2020).
40
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United Kingdom fares in comparison with
someone in Burundi.
A single person with a disposable income of
£169 per week (nearly £9,000 per year) with no
children is considered to be in the lowest 10
43
percent in the United Kingdom. That data set,
however, does not take into account the range of
other benefits and services available at no cost in
the United Kingdom. Every pupil in the United
Kingdom is entitled to around £5,000 per year for
primary education and £6,300 per year for
44
secondary education. The average per-person
cost for the U.K.’s National Health Service comes
45
in at around £3,000 per year. Averaged across all
individuals, the low-income housing benefit
amounts to approximately £5,000 annually.46
Ultimately, someone with no job and no resources
in the United Kingdom can reasonably expect to
receive around £22,000 per annum in welfare,
health, education, and housing benefits, which
equates to around $28,000 annually — more than
38 times the average per capita GDP in Burundi.
Perhaps even more surprising when
comparing relative poverty with absolute poverty
is the impact that removing national boundaries
has on data sets. According to the Giving What
We Can Global Rich List, which is run in
collaboration with Care International, that income
of £22,000 mentioned above places someone in the
top 1.46 percent of the richest people in the world
by income.47 Therefore, when compared against
an international scale of income, the very poorest
in the United Kingdom are among the richest in
the world. The United Kingdom, on this analysis,
is indeed the proverbial Village of Billionaires.
Most likely, the United States is also akin to
the Village of Billionaires, although the welfare
amount per capita is more difficult to measure for
the bottom wealth segment, which may be
needier than that segment in the United

Kingdom. The United States lacks universal
healthcare but does offer Medicaid, a healthcare
program for low-income individuals and families
48
administered by the states, and Medicare for
older U.S. citizens and residents who paid, or
whose spouses paid, the Medicare tax for at least
49
40 calendar quarters. Free public elementary and
secondary education is available for all
authorized U.S. residents and many unauthorized
residents, although rules and funding amounts
vary by state. Some public housing and housing
assistance is available, but it is not universal. Even
the basic retirement benefit under Social Security
is, like Medicare, eligibility-based.50
Other benefits are available, including
temporary assistance for needy families51 and the
supplemental nutrition assistance program (food
52
stamps), but again, eligibility is not universal.
The largest welfare benefit — supplemental
income provided through the refundable earned
income tax credit — is a function of the
individual’s income from wages or other earnings,
so unemployed individuals do not share in the
benefit. Set forth in section 32, the EITC is
estimated to be a $49 billion tax expenditure over
the decade beginning in 2019.53
Returning to the United Kingdom, in a Labour
press release, McDonnell refers to the top 1
percent as the “super rich.” He says:
It’s shocking that so many of the top 1
percent are getting tax advantages. . . . A
Labour government will be for the many,
not the few — and will tackle regional
inequality, introduce a fairer taxation
system, and clamp down on tax
54
advantages exploited by the super-rich.
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Looking at the United Kingdom from a global
perspective, however, the data suggest that even
the people to whom he is looking to redistribute
tax advantages are among the superrich. They are,
ultimately, “the few,” not “the many.” On a global
scale, McDonnell’s proposals merely take from
the top 1 percent of the top 1 percent and
redistribute to the world’s top 1 percent. On any
reasonable analysis, if based on a wider global
perspective, this is not egalitarian. It is simply the
expression of political power within a wealthy
jurisdiction to redistribute money from the
fabulously wealthy to the simply wealthy. When
McDonnell talks about regional inequality, why
restrict the discussion to regions within the U.K.
borders? Why not acknowledge that the United
Kingdom itself is just a region within a global
community?
In 2019 the Institute for Fiscal Studies reported
that in order for a U.K. taxpayer to find
themselves in the top 1 percent of income earners,
55
they would have to earn £160,000 per year. By
way of contrast, reaching the top 0.1 percent of
income earners required earning around
£650,000. The levels of inequality faced by income
earners between 0.1 and 1 percent is higher than
any other part of the income spectrum. However,
recalling the Village of Billionaires, it is as absurd
to suggest a redistribution of income from the top
0.1 percent of U.K. income earners to the top 1
percent of income earners in the name of
egalitarianism56 as it is to suggest that the top 1
percent of global income earners ought to receive
the level of benefits they receive from the top 0.1
percent of global income earners. Egalitarianism
must face this problem if it is going to be a serious
moral force in the world, rather than representing
the narrow interests of a small but lucky group of
people who happen to have been born in a
particular geographic location.
Conceptually, the system has created a
problematic moral dilemma — one not
anticipated by those within the OECD village

55

Robert Joyce, Thomas Pope, and Barra Roantree, “The
Characteristics and Incomes of the Top 1 Percent,” Institute of Fiscal
Studies Briefing Note BN253 (Aug. 2019).
56

Egalitarianism is the doctrine that all people are equal and deserve
equal rights and opportunities. In the context of this article and along
with communitarianism, egalitarianism is the belief that inequality is a
problem that needs to be addressed using government action.
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unless and until they look outside its walls. With
the problem noted, the discussion can turn to how
one can distinguish genuine egalitarian claims
from narrow political claims made by the
privileged few who, because of where they were
born, can claim significant benefits in large
welfare economies.
III. Economic vs. Egalitarian Discourse
Recognizing the problem with claims for
resource allocation in the context of relative as
opposed to absolute poverty, this section
considers whether redistributional claims made
in the name of “fairness” fulfill egalitarian aims if
they are restricted to within national boundaries.
The following discussion involving international
wage arbitrage sharpens the focus to lay the
groundwork for considering fairness in the
context of international tax.
Fairness is a quintessentially relative term.
Suggesting that a particular state of affairs — X —
is unfair requires an explanation. Why is X unfair?
It must be unfair relative to some other state of
affairs — Y — that is fair.
If one is talking about wages, for example, a
fair wage should be relative to some situation in
which the wage paid is unfair, and that judgment
must be based on some kind of reasoning. The
comparator group is clearly important. One
person earning £8 per hour in London might be
said to be receiving and unfair wage relative to
someone earning £5,000 per hour for doing the
same work. Why should one person get paid
more than another for the same thing? This
reasoning is applied in discrimination legislation,
which outlaws paying one person less because of
a protected characteristic such as gender, race,
and age. The U.K. Equality Act 2010 is just one
example. Notably, like other discrimination laws,
it does not, as we shall see below, apply between
jurisdictions. There also may be regional
variations within a jurisdiction, although those
tend to be a function of the cost of living. How
does one consider the fairness of a wage of £8 per
hour in one country versus a group that might be
making £8 per week elsewhere?
Claims of fairness are frequently made by
groups within a jurisdiction or a region seeking to
advance their economic or political position.
Trade unions, for example, often use the term “fair
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pay” to advance an economic demand for higher
wages and improved conditions for their workers.
The fair pay being demanded by certain trade
unions, however, is not the sort of fairness that
matters in a more traditional Marxist analysis.
Take, for example, the demands of the British
Airline Pilots Association (BALPA), a pilots’
union, in a recent call for a strike against British
Airways. The airline’s pilots were dissatisfied
with an offer to increase their £167,000 per annum
salaries by 11.5 percent to around £186,000. The
union declared that the pilots wanted more
because the company was making large profits,
describing the demands as “fair and
57
reasonable.” BALPA was not concerned by the
inequality between its members and the cabin
crew (who earned between £16,000 and £27,000),
instead focusing the claim of fairness on the £1.3
million salary afforded to the chief executive
58
officer.
Can a pilot earning over £185,000 a year really
be considered to be suffering from unfairness in
the egalitarian sense? It seems reasonable to
assume that those making demands of this sort —
demands that they present as issues of fairness —
are in fact simply economic agents using their
collective ability to disrupt business to enrich
themselves. These demands are not really
examples of egalitarianism at work; rather, they
show the exercise of economic power.
In classic Marxist theory, as discussed below,
fairness is central to organizing labor markets.
This ubiquitous term suffers from a problem
when one removes national boundaries and
considers fairness across an international
spectrum. Friedrich Engels suggests that:
the produce of the workman’s labour goes
to the Capitalist, and the workman gets
out of it no more than the bare necessaries
of life. And thus the end of this
uncommonly “fair” race of competition is
that the produce of the labour of those
who do work, gets unavoidably
accumulated in the hands of those that do
not work, and becomes in their hands the

most powerful means to enslave the very
men who produced it.59
Writing in the late 19th century, Engels might
be forgiven for simplifying the complex
relationship between rewards afforded to one
who risks capital in developing new, uncertain
enterprises (that is, equity capital) and returns
afforded to capital provided on a lower risk basis
(for example, interest on a loan). However, in the
context of an international economy, the concept
of fairness needs to be further explored.
Consider the way in which the advantages of
international trade, specifically that which
involves international labor arbitrage, accrue and
to whom. Labor arbitrage occurs when a company
elects to move its workforce to a country where
wages are lower and the overall cost of doing
business is reduced. One of the most successful
companies to engage in international labor
arbitrage is Associated British Foods, the holding
company that owns Primark. Primark, a huge
MNE in its own right with more than 75,000
employees around the world, sells a range of
fashion and homeware items to stores in
developed economies. The company has been
hailed as an enormous success; according to its
2019 annual revenue numbers, it sells around £7.8
billion of its products, generating a pretax profit
of around £913 million.60 For investors, however,
the returns have not been spectacular. Over the
last 10 years, an investor would have received
dividend income of around 1.6 percent, and their
capital would have increased by around 7 percent
61
per annum on a compound basis. This compares
with a risk-free return on the 10-year U.K.
government bond yield of about 5 percent over
62
the same period.
From an investor’s perspective, returns that
only exceed those from a risk-free investment in
government bonds by 3.6 percent have been
adequate, but they are fairly pedestrian when
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63

compared with other large companies. Who,
then, has benefited the most from Primark’s
spectacular rise? The consumer. Primark’s
consumer demographic, which is at the lower end
of the developed economy’s labor market, has
benefited from lower prices that Primark has
achieved using labor arbitrage. In other words,
the relatively poor are benefiting at the expense of
the absolute poor. As Richard Hyman, an exdirector of market research firm Mintel pointed
out:
There has been a lot of justifiably bad
publicity about ethical sourcing, paying
people a pittance and all that, but I am
afraid the truth is that comfortable
middle-class people may be able to adopt
the moral high ground, but most people
64
can’t.
In 2008 an investigation into Primark revealed
that the firm had been benefiting from child labor
with workers as young as 11.65 Investigators found
that workers in India were being paid as little as
the equivalent to 60 pence per day. By way of
contrast, the national living wage in the United
Kingdom, applicable to workers age 25 and older,
66
rose to £8.72 as of April 2020. These figures,
however, underestimate the benefits that
individuals living in modern, developed welfare
economies receive, as discussed in the previous
section.
Consumers in developed economies saw the
price of apparel drop about 4.25 percent from
67
2000 to 2019. Compare that with the U.K.
consumer price index’s growth of around 67
percent over the same period. Who has benefited
from, to use Engel’s term, the workman’s labor?

63
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Based on the data, the lower-income brackets in
developed economies.
What the analysis above shows is that use of
economic bargaining groups within well-off
nationalities, including even the poorest in those
societies, will not result in a cogent egalitarian
redistribution. Compare the minimum wage in
the United Kingdom with the sorts of wages being
68
paid in, for example, Bangladesh — on an hourly
basis, that is £8.72 versus around 45 pence. In
those circumstances, where would the tax on the
profits of, for example, Primark be allocated in a
fair global economy? Should we look to increase
the tax revenue allocated to the U.K. where
Primark has its head office and the annual
government revenue amounts to about $1 trillion,
or to Bangladesh where it produces many of the
goods that it sells and the annual government
revenue amounts to about $24 billion?
If international government welfare budgets
and international wages were taken into account
when considering the nebulous term “fairness,”
how can we possibly argue in favor of increasing
developed countries’ demands for tax revenue?
Surely any egalitarian can only advocate for a
large-scale redistribution toward the low-wage
and low-government-welfare economies in which
many MNEs operate.
IV. BEPS 2.0
The work program produced by the OECD in
May 2019 was approved by 129 members of the
inclusive framework. It sought to resolve issues
that members believed the initial BEPS package
failed to address and to limit what appeared to be
a proliferation of unilateral actions by individual
jurisdictions.
The work program’s proposals rest on two
pillars that form what is commonly referred to as
BEPS 2.0. The first pillar seeks to reallocate taxing
rights toward countries that control the users or
consumers (the market jurisdiction). The second
pillar is designed to address the residual
problems relating to BEPS risk, specifically the
problem of profits being allocated to countries
with no or low taxation. The focus of the second

66
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108

68

Marjorie van Elven, “Bangladesh Raises Minimum Wage for
Garment Workers,” Fashion United, Sept. 4, 2018.

TAX NOTES INTERNATIONAL, JULY 6, 2020
®
Electronic
copy
available
at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3648413
For more Tax
Notes
International
content, please visit www.taxnotes.com.

© 2020 Tax Analysts. All rights reserved. Tax Analysts does not claim copyright in any public domain or third party content.

VIEWPOINT

pillar is the global anti-base-erosion (GLOBE)
proposal. Paragraph 54 of the work program
explains that a key aim of GLOBE is:
to stop a harmful race to the bottom,
which otherwise risks shifting taxes to
fund public goods onto less mobile bases
including labour and consumption,
effectively undermining the tax
sovereignty of nations and their elected
legislators.
The proposal continues to suggest that it is
often developing countries that offer those tax
incentives to try and recruit economic activity in
their jurisdictions. The document states this often
harms those developing countries and that the
GLOBE proposals could:
effectively shield developing countries
from the pressure to offer inefficient
incentives and in doing so help them in
better mobilising domestic resources by
ensuring that they will be able to
effectively tax returns on investment made
in their countries.
The proposals, which are in keeping with the
general principles surrounding the wider BEPS
project, focus on tackling international tax
arbitrage and preventing companies from using
the international system to erode the tax base of
higher-tax jurisdictions by placing profits in lowor no-tax jurisdictions.
The OECD suggests that pillar 2:
seeks to develop rules that would provide
jurisdictions with a right to “tax back”
where other jurisdictions have not
exercised their primary taxing rights or
the payment is otherwise subject to low
69
levels of effective taxation.
Notably, this statement makes no reference to
whether the state that has the right to tax must
take into account whether it is appropriate to do
so. For example, is it appropriate for a wealthy
country with high tax and a comprehensive
welfare system to take advantage of this tax back
even if it is to the detriment of a poorer nation?

69

OECD, “OECD Secretariat Invites Public Input on the Global AntiBase Erosion (GloBE) Proposal Under Pillar Two” (Nov. 8, 2019).

The U.S. system has long given rise to
concerns of this sort, and other OECD members
have criticized the United States because of its
worldwide taxation of domestic taxpayers
described in Treas. reg. section 1.1-1(b). While U.S.
individuals and entities are subject to tax in the
U.S. on all income from all sources, the United
States cedes primary taxing authority to the
country in which the income is generated through
a foreign tax credit. The amount of the credit is the
lesser of the amount of tax properly paid in the
foreign jurisdiction or the amount of U.S. tax
attributable to the income produced in that
jurisdiction. By capturing the excess of the U.S. tax
over the foreign tax, the United States frustrates
any attempt by developing jurisdictions to use tax
concessions to encourage investment of capital in
that jurisdiction. Some discussions suggested that
an exclusive tax savings clause in the governing
tax treaty could limit taxes to those imposed
where the economic activity takes place and
prevent the United States and other jurisdictions
from claiming tax that the developing economy
intentionally relinquished to attract capital
investment.
In the past, U.S. persons could temporarily
avoid the U.S. tax by operating through a foreign
entity (other than one that is tax transparent for
U.S. tax purposes, like a partnership). Under that
regime, which had been detailed in sections 901
and 902, repatriation of foreign-source income
was taxable in the United States — that is, U.S. tax
applied (with direct and indirect credits for
foreign taxes paid) when the foreign entity
distributed funds to its U.S. owner. However, U.S.
tax legislation enacted in 2017 (the Tax Cuts and
Jobs Act (P.L. 115-97)) substantially eliminated the
tax on distributions from a foreign corporation to
its U.S. corporate shareholders through the 100
percent dividends received deduction in section
245A. This aligns the U.S. tax structure for
corporations and their subsidiaries with the
territorial tax systems characteristic of the United
Kingdom and the member states of the EU. Given
the long-standing criticism of U.S. exceptionalism
and its worldwide taxation, it is ironic that the
BEPS project is now initiating a tax back
conversation to prevent the supposed race to the
bottom.
For all the talk in connection with the BEPS
project about undermining the “fairness and
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70

integrity of our tax systems,” the project does not
address the far bigger issue of where any
additional tax ought to go in accordance with an
egalitarian analysis. Instead, BEPS 2.0 focuses on
quantifying the profits subject to the new taxing
rights, designing a nexus rule that is not
constrained by physical location, and issues
relating to implementation and administration.
Perhaps the OECD’s proposals to consider a
minimum rate of tax might address some of these
issues. The OECD states that:
a minimum tax rate on all income reduces
the incentive for taxpayers to engage in
profit shifting and establishes a floor for
71
tax competition among jurisdictions.
The problem with this proposal, however, lies
in the fact that minimum levels of taxation
imposed on MNEs may simply lead to head-office
jurisdiction shopping — to some extent, it already
has when taking into account, for example,
72
Ireland’s ultralow corporation tax. It is difficult
to see a minimum tax falling below the Irish
corporate tax rate. Further, the GLOBE proposal is
largely targeted at solving specific issues
pertaining to the digital economy along with
ancillary and perennial issues such as those
relating to the taxation of permanent
establishments and foreign branches. The type of
problems the OECD is addressing do not come
close to the changes that must be made if the
world decides to take international wealth,
income, and tax resource inequality seriously. For
international inequality to be addressed in a
meaningful way, taxation rights and revenue
would need to be allocated with wholesale
redistribution of resources across the world in
mind and without regard to any other
consideration. Judging by the pending OECD
proposals, this sort of redistribution is not on the
near horizon.
The proposal here is straightforward. If the
technical debate surrounding BEPS 2.0 proceeds
as expected, jurisdictions should refrain from

using terms such as “fairness” and “justice” in
presenting their case. The debate should proceed
solely on the premise that there are multiple
parties with varying interests and degrees of
political and economic power, and they all fully
intend on expressing that power to further their
desired individual welfare. The international
forum for tax agreements between countries is
73
rather like the Hobbesian state of nature : There is
no overarching Leviathan who can determine the
rules and arbitrate disputes. Instead, the mutual
and complementary self-interests of the
participants and the expression of power will
ultimately drive the outcome.
Evidence suggests that, at least in the debate
surrounding BEPS, the OECD’s deliberations and
consultations are really an effort to referee the
sparring match among international economic
powers. It is not about justice or fairness — rather,
it is about distributing power across wealthy
nations. States with high-tax, high-spend
economies were poised to explore unilateral
action, particularly in the form of digital services
taxes, which disproportionately affected U.S.
internet corporations. By spring of 2020 at least 14
countries had either enacted DSTs or made plans
to do so: Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic,
France, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Norway, Poland,
Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Turkey, and the United
74
Kingdom.
For example, the 3 percent DST that France
passed in July 2019 targeted around 30 large
technology businesses, including Facebook,
Amazon, and Google.75 The tax applied to firms
with revenues of greater than €750 million that
were generated from “digital activities,”
including revenue greater than €25 million in
France. The United States immediately launched
an investigation suggesting France’s DST unfairly
targeted U.S. interests. President Trump also
suggested that the imposition of the DST might
result in retaliatory tariffs on a number of French
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products sold into the U.S. market, including
wine. In an unedifying display of diplomacy,
Trump described French President Emmanuel
Macron’s decision to press ahead with the DST as
“foolishness,” while French Finance Minister
Bruno La Maire urged the United States to avoid
76
mixing the DST debate with general trade policy.
By the end of August 2019 the United States and
France had reached a compromise. Under the
teams of the deal, France agreed to scrap its DST
once a new international levy had been agreed
upon at the OECD level.
Despite the compromise with France, the
U.S.’s aggressive approach to international trade
led to a ruling in its favor allowing it to impose
$7.5 billion of countermeasures against European
77
goods. This ruling arose as a result of European
subsidies to Airbus, which the WTO agreed had
caused harm to the U.S. economy over several
decades.
The economic negotiations surrounding how
countries trade and tax each other’s goods and
services will no doubt continue. It appears likely
that multilateral institutions such as the WTO and
the OECD will help ensure rules-based systems
remain in place and allow trade to flourish. But
are these international rules-based institutions
truly dispensing justice and fairness? We would
argue, at least from an egalitarian perspective,
that the answer is no.
We believe that terms like “fairness” or
“justice” should be reserved for actions or
discussions that involve a global understanding
of inequality, and we respectfully assert that this is
the only cogent position that an egalitarian can
honestly take. Lobbying groups, trade unions,
and domestic political bodies have devoted large
amounts of time and resources purporting to
advance socialism, but instead they merely
advanced the narrow, parochial, and regional
interests of their members. They have focused on
the economic and political well-being of their
small constituent groups, arguing for advancing
the global top 1 percent at the expense of the
global 0.1 percent.

True communitarians must feel regret when
they recognize there is another 99 percent living
outside their Village of Billionaires. If they truly
care about justice and fairness, the mission starts
and finishes with this acknowledgment.
V. Global Distributive Justice
The Village of Billionaires parable
demonstrates the absurdity of limiting
redistribution to a small and privileged
community. This section examines why the
arguments in favor of global redistributive justice
have comprehensively failed to gain traction.
As we have noted, those arguing for a narrow
domestic redistribution wealth are not doing so
based on morality or fairness — rather, this
position is simply an expression of power. The
proponents’ interests are defined by virtue of the
78
power they hold. Kenneth Waltz argues that the
system of international relations is akin to
anarchy with no central agent enforcing the
rules.79 This realist perspective helps to explain
why hopes for fairness or justice are unlikely to
result in practical arrangements that reflect
morality. Setting aside the realists’ concerns about
practical application, if a fair system could be
introduced, what would it involve?
Many thinkers, including a group known as
cosmopolitans, have considered this question. In
“Famine, Affluence and Morality,” Peter Singer
poses a thought experiment, asking what moral
responsibility may arise if, while on the way to
work, someone discovers a child drowning in a
80
pond. Singer concludes that the inconvenience
of getting wet and dirty can never outweigh the
possible loss of a child’s life. We suggest there is a
parallel between that situation and the obligations
we face when we are aware of the extreme,
absolute poverty that many suffer from around
the world.
Other cosmopolitan thinkers have discussed
these issues since Singer published his article in
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81

1972. Broadly, the cosmopolitan theory revolves
around three essential elements, which Thomas
82
Pogge sets out in several of his works. The first
element identifies individuals, as opposed to
family, cultures, or religions as the correct unit of
concern. The second element requires
universality, meaning there can be no
discrimination of gender, race, or age. Finally,
there is a requirement of generality so that all
people ought to have concern for all other people
equally, removing national, religious, and cultural
ties. In the end, the cosmopolitans adhere to the
golden rule, an imperative with a long, rich
heritage.83
Even within the cosmopolitan community,
there is disagreement about how a universal,
nondiscriminatory distribution might take place.
Martha Nussbaum, for example, argues that “it is
right to give the local an additional measure of
84
concern if it is the only sensible way to do good.”
Similarly, Robert Goodin argues that one might be
compelled to privilege one’s fellow countrymen in
order to fulfill one’s general duties.85 In our view,
however, these positions do nothing to alleviate
the concern that distributions from the top 0.1
percent to the top 1 percent do not meaningfully
fulfill any moral duties to the other 99 percent.
What might justify the obvious abandonment
of those suffering in the global 99 percent? The
theory of nationalism, which sets forth several
duties that apply to individuals within a smaller
collective, offers one possible response. David
Miller identifies five aspects to a nationalist
obligation: (i) a common identity (ii) that is
marked off by a distinctive public culture, (iii) in
which members recognize special obligations to
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one another, (iv) regard the nation as a valuable
good, and (v) aspire to be politically self86
determining. Yael Tamir suggests that liberal
nationalism is not grounded in consent or
reciprocity; instead, it is based on shared feelings
87
of belonging or connectedness.
Small collective units of humans engender a
closeness and, inevitably, a feeling of mutual
obligation. The family unit is the most obvious
example. However, when the ties that bind
individuals are stretched too far and the elements
of common identity or public culture are so
strained that they render their application
meaningless, they may no longer warrant mutual
obligation.
Consider three towns: Utqiagvik (formerly
known as Barrow), Alaska; El Paso, Texas; and
Ciudad Juarez, Mexico. Utqiagvik is the
northernmost city in the United States. It falls
inside the Arctic Circle on Alaska’s northern coast.
The city has been a home to an indigenous Inuit
group for more than 1,000 years. The lifestyle,
jobs, and economy revolve around the activities
one might expect given its location. It is difficult to
imagine two places with greater contrasts in terms
of size, weather, lifestyle, jobs, and economy than
Utqiagvik and El Paso, a west Texas city that lies
adjacent to Ciudad Juarez. In 2019 Ronald Rael
and Virginia San Fratello designed an art
installation: a set of pink seesaws bridging the
border between the United States and Mexico,
with a beam in the border wall itself acting as the
88
fulcrum. According to Rael, it is an effort to bring
“jobs, excitement and togetherness [to] the border
wall.”
Despite being in different countries, images of
children on either side of the wall playing
together illustrate a connection similar to that one
might expect from the conditions like those
described by Miller — a connection that could
never be achieved between El Paso and Utqiagvik.
Even the languages spoken in El Paso and Ciudad
Juarez (English and Spanish) bear a closer link
than the languages in El Paso and Utqiagvik,
where the locals speak Inupiaq and have long
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rejected outside (read: U.S.) cultural influences,
even changing the city’s name from Barrow to
89
Utqiagvik in 2016.
Is instinctive human closeness — such as the
connections established on the seesaws of El Paso
and Ciudad Juarez — less relevant than the
obligations that connect El Paso and Utqiagvik
merely because of the shape of U.S. borders?
Which pair of cities really shares a connection, a
culture, and mutual obligations? Do El Paso and
Utqiagvik have a way of sharing aspirations,
including the mutual desire to be politically selfdetermining, or regard the nation as a valuable
good because they share a common culture? It
seems difficult to base obligations on arbitrarily
drawn borders.
John Rawls suggests that richer nations
should provide aid to poorer societies to help
them develop better political systems based on
90
justice. In Law of Peoples, he argues a weaker
version of his original position on global justice, a
concept expressed in his A Theory of Justice.91 But
he remains indifferent to the inequalities that
might arise once this goal has been achieved,
which is why his global theory is said to focus on
the equality of peoples as opposed to persons.
Rawls has been widely criticized for the
narrow scope of his work. For example, Derek
Parfit believes that Rawls should better account
for global inequality.92 Parfit suggests that the
difference principle — which gives absolute
priority to ensuring a benefit to those who are
worse off — cannot credibly be limited to borders
of a nation state. Instead, he says there is no
reason not to extend the principle globally.
Separately, Pogge and Charles Beitz argue that the
things that bind nations together, including
complex economic and social interdependence,
have grown increasingly complex such that the
interconnectedness could justify the type of
cooperation on a global level that Rawls argued
for within the state.93
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This position is important in the context of
discussions about how to tax MNEs fairly and
distribute the income derived from that tax
revenue. The Rawlsian analysis, which recognizes
obligations that arise in complex systems of social
cooperation, cannot ignore the fact that MNEs
span the globe. By their very nature, they cross
national boundaries; therefore, when considering
how justice applies to MNEs and the tax revenues
that arise from their operations, a global solution
is inviting. Pillar 1 of BEPS 2.0 doesn’t couch the
idea that taxing rights should focus on consumers
or users in the language of justice or fairness.
Rather, it is the language that one might expect to
be used in the boardrooms of MNEs or the
government offices of countries seeking to further
their own individual interests without regard to
what Rawlsian justice, global prioritarianism, or
egalitarianism might require.
In the 21st century, the complex interplay
between economic entities renders the concept of
the nation-state far more amorphous than it was
before. Cities like London, Tokyo, and New York
have far more in common with each other than
they do with Scunthorpe, Niseko, and Utqiagvik,
despite each of those towns sharing a country
with each of those cities. Similarly, international
treaties confirming economic, defense, and
political arrangements — including the complex
relationships represented by the EU, Association
of Southeast Asian Nations, and NATO — make it
difficult to isolate the interests of one country as a
wholly separate unit. Written in 1624, the oftquoted line from John Donne’s Devotions Upon
Emergent Occasions has never been more apt: “No
man is an island, entire of itself; every man is a
piece of the continent, a part of the main.”
The political and economic obligations that
arise as in this connected world must, at some
stage, invite political philosophers to reconsider
the parochial nature of their work — especially
those who take the Rawlsian position on
nationally confined redistribution. From an
egalitarian perspective, the moral imperative
demands one take account of global inequalities.
One who argues for a position that ignores global
inequalities is simply advocating for the interests
of the top 1 percent and is acting as a political
lobbyist, not a moral beacon.
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VI. Conclusion
The Village of Billionaires parable debunks
the “fairness” and “fair share” concepts favoring
redistribution of wealth and resources when the
redistribution is limited to the borders of
developed nations. Instead, the presence of
absolute poverty globally renders the relative
poverty within developed economies trivial and
not fit for fairness or fair share redistribution
demands. Resource allocation locally — whether
that means within a family unit, a region within a
state, a single state, or even within all OECD
member states — simply demonstrates the use of
political power in advancing self-interest. Sadly,
much like a single meal supplied to an
impoverished individual, the parable of the
Village of Billionaires leaves one feeling
emptiness and despair — a truth with which
international relief agencies are all too familiar.
Durable solutions to international wealth
disparity are elusive. Citing a deeper
understanding of fairness and the meaning of a
true fair share, charities, engaged scholars and
political actors may continue to press for change,
taking small steps to encourage the global 1
percent — and the governments of the countries
in which they live — to contribute more revenue
to international development regardless of
whether that revenue is attributable to successful

114

BEPS adjustments. In so doing, the elite need not
cede taxing power to undeveloped and
developing economies that may not deploy their
taxing power efficiently. Instead, the OECD and
other international agencies dedicated to
developing and improving tax structures could
emphasize allocating a larger share of the
worldwide tax base to regions where wages and
resources are low, which invites international
exploitation by MNEs, by defining the tax base
and its allocation in terms of value created by
labor and resources rather than consumer
94
markets.
Or one might seek to level worldwide
resources under a utopian (or dystopian) system
of redistribution based on a worldwide Marxian
model, a theory that has already proven
95
unworkable even on a small, national scale.  
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